Deniable Authentication protocols allow a Sender to authenticate a message for a Receiver, in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place.
INTRODUCTION
Authentication is arguably the most important security goal in cryptography. When communication happens over a real-life network we need to make sure that we are talking to the right person and not with an impostor.
Authentication, thus, has received a lot of attention in the cryptographic literature. Authentication methods follow the usual distinction between private and public key techniques. In a private key scenario, two parties Alice and Bob share a secret key k and use that to prove to each other that they are the originators of the messages. Usually this is done by Alice sending a message m to Bob together with a tag t, which is computed as a function of the message m and the key k. The pair m, t is verified by Bob as coming from Alice if the tag matches the one that B can compute on his own, with m and k. The tag is called a message authentication code and must satisfy some security properties (namely unforgeability) in order for this technique to be meaningful.
On the other hand in the public key scenario, message authentication has been long associated with digital signatures [7] . In this case, Alice is publicly associated with a public key pkA which is matched to a secret key skA known only to her. When Alice wants to authenticate a message m, again she computes a tag t as a function of the secret key skA and the message m. The tag in this case is called a digital signature, and again must satisfy some meaningful notion of unforgeability (see [16] ). The interesting twist is that the tag can be verified by anybody using the public key pkA.
This last property is a very useful feature of digital signatures, as it provides the crucial non-repudiation feature. Once Alice signs a message, she is bound to it. Everybody can verify that she signed it. This is very useful when digital signatures are used for contracts or commerce transactions, where conditions must be enforced in case of dispute.
On the other hand, this feature raises important privacy issues. What if Alice wants to say something very private to Bob, in a way that Bob believes it comes from her, but also in a way that Bob cannot convince a third party that Alice said such a thing? Or even that Alice spoke to Bob at all? Clearly digital signatures do not allow Alice to do this.
Notice that message authentication codes do not provide for non-repudiation, as the tag could be easily computed by the receiver. In other words once Bob gets m, t from Alice, he is convinced that it comes from her (as apart from Bob she is the only one who can compute t), but Bob can't show this to Charlie and convince him that it comes from Alice, as Bob could have computed t on his own.
But what if Alice and Bob don't have a shared secret key? They could, in principle, run a key exchange protocol (see for example [7, 3] ). At the end of such protocol Alice and Bob hold a shared secret key k, and then they could use it to authenticate messages. But since most of the known key exchange protocols use digital signatures to authenticate the parties running them, at the end Bob can still convince Charlie that he spoke to Alice, even if not specifically about the subject of the conversation.
Deniable Authentication The issue of deniability in public key authentication was brought forward and formalized by Dwork, Naor and Sahai, in their groundbreaking paper on concurrent zero-knowledge [10] . The paradigm suggested in [10] is to replace the non-interactive communication of a digital signature, with a communication protocol between Alice and Bob on input a message m. At the end of the protocol Bob is convinced that Alice wants to authenticate m to him, but will not be able to convince a third party as his view of the communication can be easily produced a posteriori even without the knowledge of Alice's secret key skA. This property is called deniability. This protocol should maintain some meaningful unforgeability property, i.e. it should be hard for an adversary to convince Bob that Alice wants to authenticate a message m.
Dwork et al. point out that, since we are introducing interaction, we should consider what happens in a concurrent scenario, i.e. one in which an adversary may schedule executions of protocols and delay messages in arbitrary ways. That is, unforgeability and deniability should still hold against such a powerful attacker. This turned out to be a very powerful attack model, especially when considering zero-knowledge protocols.
The basic solution for deniable authentication based on encryption can be summarized as follows (this protocol appeared first in [22] , and similar protocols appear also in [9, 10] ). Bob chooses a random key k and encrypts it under Alice's public key. Alice decrypts such key and uses it to MAC the message m. Bob's belief that Alice is really authenticating m comes from the fact that she is the only one able to decrypt k. On the other hand, Bob could create the whole transcript on his own, so the authentication is deniable.
The unforgeability of the above scheme is proven in [22, 3, 9, 10] if the encryption scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) [26, 9] . Informally, an encryption scheme E is said to be CCA2-secure if the secrecy of a message m, encrypted as c = E pk (m), holds up even if an adversary is allowed to obtain decryption of any ciphertext of her choice (except of course c). It should be clear why this property is needed in the above scheme: Alice is in effect acting almost like a decryption oracle, on ciphertexts that are under the control of Bob, whenever asked to authenticate a message (the "almost" comes from the fact that Alice does not answer directly k, but rather M AC k (m)).
Surprisingly deniability for the above scheme cannot be easily proven, even if E is CCA2-secure. No attack is known, but no proof is known either 1 . In order to make the above scheme provably deniable, a basic challenge-response subprotocol is added in [10] . However this introduces a rewinding step in the proof, which causes the deniability property to hold only if copies of the protocol are performed sequentially, and not concurrently. In order to overcome this problem Dwork et al. introduce timing assumptions on the network to limit the number of concurrent executions that can be performed by the adversary in the network. We refer to the above solution as the CCA-paradigm for deniable authentication.
Other approaches: In the literature there are alternatives that require the receiver/verifier to have a public key: Designated Verifier Proofs [20] permit to create signatures that convince only the intended recipient (using his public key); Ring Signatures [29] permit a member of an ad hoc group to sign a message on behalf of the group, i.e. it is impossible to trace the actual signer inside the group. This solution can be used to create deniable signatures by choosing the sender and the receiver as members of the group: the signature is deniable as the receiver could have created it too. Notice that, as observed in [27] , in ring signatures the public keys should be registered with a proof-of-knowledge of the corresponding secret-key: suppose that the receiver B registers a public key pkB that is equal (or derived through a suitable one-way function) to A's one. If the ring signature has been created using these two public keys the involvement of A in the signature process is hardly deniable, since B has a way of proving that he does not know its own secret key.
In [27] there is another solution named Deniable Ring Authentication that combines the encryption-based approach of Dwork et al. with the Ring Signatures: one member (or a proper sub-structure) of a group can sign a message in a deniable way towards a receiver that is not required to have a public key. This solution can be considered as an extension of the Dwork et al. work, so it falls into the CCA-paradigm.
The requirement of a registered public key for both parties creates a less general model that does not fit in all practical applications (e.g. the Internet, where most users do not have public keys). Thus, we can conclude that in the most general setting, where only the prover is required to own a public key, all the known solutions which are secure in a concurrent setting follow the CCA-paradigm.
What if the Sender changes her mind?
In the definition of deniable authentication we assume that the Sender wants to preserve his privacy, and thus prevent the Receiver from proving to a third party that he received a message from the Sender. However there are scenarios in which deniability is actually a concern to the Receiver's privacy.
Consider the following example. Alice and Bob are involved in some shady transaction, like drug-dealing or money laundering. Alice wants to make sure that her communications to Bob cannot be later linked to her, so she uses deniable authentication. Bob thinking that such communication is indeed deniable, stores all the messages in his hard disk. Later the operation is busted by the police and Alice and Bob end up in jail, and Bob's computer is seized. Alice is offered a sweet deal in exchange for her cooperation in linking Bob to the crime (Bob is claiming the messages in his hard disk are not coming from Alice, that he never talked to her, actually does not even know her, they are all simulations!!). Alice produces some piece of secret information (her secret key for example) that indeed shows that the transcripts in Bob's hard disk are actually authentic and not simulations. Bob ends up in jail, cursing himself for dropping out of crypto class in graduate school.
The above example shows that deniability is not just a concern of the Sender, but also of the Receiver. What we would like to happen is that if the Sender acts honestly during the protocols, she should not be able at a later stage to claim the messages as authentic. We call this property forward deniability, as it has some affinity to the notion of forward secrecy 2 . We would like to point out that the above CCA-based paradigm is indeed forward deniable. However the issue of forward deniability has not been discussed in the literature, and indeed we show that some proposed deniable protocols are not forward deniable (see below).
Our Contribution
New Approaches. The first question we asked was: "Are there other approaches to concurrent deniable authentication, besides the CCA paradigm?"
3 . We provide a positive answer to this question. We show that deniable authentication can be constructed out of different primitives.
The question is interesting for both theoretical and practical reasons. On the theoretical front, it is not clear why encryption must be needed at all, to build authentication protocols. One of our solutions uses a special kind of commitment scheme, thus showing that deniable authentication, while linked to non-malleability issues, is not linked to nonmalleable encryption. The practical reason is that by creating new paradigms for deniable authentication we may end up with more efficient protocols or protocols based on weaker computational assumptions. This is indeed what we do in this paper.
We present two new schemes for deniable authentication. The first scheme eliminates the need for an encryption scheme altogether. We build deniable authentication protocols, using special kinds of trapdoor commitment schemes (the multi-trapdoor commitments of Gennaro [12] ). The protocols using this approach are incredibly simple and efficient: the cost of the protocol is twice that of a regular digital signature 4 . The second scheme can be seen as an improvement of the CCA-paradigm when implemented with the CramerShoup's CCA schemes in [6] . Namely, we use some specific properties of the projective hash functions [6] used in those schemes to build a new kind of deniable authentication. The scheme can still be thought as the encryption of a random key which is then used to MAC the message; however, it is not clear how to argue if the encryption module is CCA-secure. The net result is that we save one modular exponentiation compared to the CCA-paradigm solution, and the transcripts are shorter.
Improved Efficiency and Reductions. Our schemes are very efficient, and require four rounds. They can be proven secure in a concurrent setting, but the proof of deniability requires timing assumptions.
On the other hand the proof of unforgeability holds even without timing assumption: while this is not a new feature of our schemes (the CCA-paradigm enjoys it too) it is still remarkable, as this proof in our commitment-based protocol uses rewinding as well, but in a way that does not compromise security in unbounded concurrent executions.
An interesting feature of the commitment-based protocol is that in a realistic multi-user setting (like the one we consider in this paper) the security reduction depends linearly on the number of players in the network while for the CCAparadigm protocols the dependency is linear in the number of sessions. The latter can be a much higher paramater and thus the improvement is not just a mere theoretical feature but it is important in practice as it guarantees security with much smaller parameters and consequently improved efficiency.
Forward Deniability. Finally we present a formal definition of forward deniability. We prove that a large class of computational zero-knowledge protocols (i.e. those in which deniability is obtained by reduction to a computational ZK protocol for an NP-complete language) are not forward deniable. We also prove that other protocols in the literature (including our new proposals) are forward deniable.
To prove our schemes we present a unifying model to define deniable authentication. To prove that our protocols are secure authenticators we use the model introduced by Bellare et al. [3] . We then integrate the notion of deniability and forward deniability to it, by adding the required simulation properties.
Related Work
As we said above, the first solution is based on the notion of multi-trapdoor commitments [12] . These commitments were introduced, extending the work of Katz [21] , to deal with malleability issues in concurrent executions of proofs of knowledge. In our solution we exploit in a novel and original way their non-malleability properties in order to obtain deniable authentication. We note that some of the constructions of simulation-sound commitments presented in [24] (namely the ones that achieve information-theoretic privacy of the message) can also be used in our construction 5 . The second solution exploits the properties of -universal projective hash functions [6] , to relax the requirement on the key establishment mechanism in the CCA paradigm. It is somewhat related to a recent improvement to the CramerShoup CCA encryption proposed by Kurosawa and Desmedt [23] . They consider the hybrid version of the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem described in [30] . There the encryption scheme is split in a Key Encapsulation Module (KEM) where the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme is used to encrypt a random key, and a Data Encapsulation Module where the message is encrypted and MAC'ed using the above key. Kurosawa and Desmedt note that in this scenario it is not strictly necessary that the KEM is CCA-secure, and indeed they show how to convert the Cramer-Shoup KEM in one which is still sufficient for the overall CCA-security of the hybrid encryption, yet it is not known to be CCA secure itself. The net result is an improvement in the efficiency of the overall scheme (especially when considering the improved proof of security presented in [13] .). In doing so, however Kurosawa and Desmedt introduced a stronger requirement on the projective hash functions used in the scheme.
Our work, which was done independently from [23] , follows a related path for the case of deniable authentication. But our solution is conceptually simpler, again because we remove the need to encrypt anything. Instead of using the projective hash functions to establish a random key (which is the source of the stronger requirement in [23] ), we use it directly as a message authenticator. Thus the original notion of -universality in [6] suffices.
Comparison with Katz's protocols. The CCA-paradigm for deniable authentication can also be considered in the context of interactive CCA-secure encryption protocols (exploiting the fact that since deniable authentication already introduces interaction, then we can use interaction also inside the encryption step). We point to the results of Katz [21] in this area. The protocols presented there, exploit the interactive nature of the encryption step, in order to get solutions which are more efficient than the ones based on the basic CCA-paradigm. In order to achieve interactive CCA-security, Katz uses proofs of plaintext knowledge for semantic secure encryptions (or even trapdoor permutations in some cases), combined with a non-malleable commitment scheme.
Our solutions show that if one strengthens the commitments used by Katz to be multi-trapdoor ones, then the commitments themselves yield efficient deniable authentication protocol. Thus we dispense with using encryption altogether. The tradeoff is that we use stronger computational assumptions: while the protocols in [21] can be proven secure based on the regular RSA and Computational DiffieHellman assumptions, the efficient istantiations of our protocols require either the Strong RSA, DSA, or Strong DH assumptions.
The efficiency of our protocol 6 is basically the same as the ones in [21] . However our protocol does not require one-time signature schemes, making the communication much shorter than in [21] . Finally our security reduction is more efficient as it depends only on the number of parties in the network, while Katz's depends on the total number of sessions.
Practical Applications
Deniability is an important privacy-enabling feature of cryptographic protocols and as such has many important practical applications.
The practical importance of this concept can be seen by the weight that deniability issues have played in the design of Internet key exchange protocols (see for example [22, 19, 25] ).
Electronic elections are another example of the importance of deniability. There, while it is important that both parties (the voting authority and the voter) authenticate each other, it is also mandatory to prevent either party from walking away with a non-repudiable proof of what the actual vote was (the message being authenticated). This application, in particular, shows the importance of forward deniability: if the voter (sender) is authenticating her vote to the authority, not only the latter should not be able to prove to a third party how the voter voted, but even more importantly the voter herself should not be able to do so at a later stage, to prevent coercion and vote-selling.
Finally we point out that deniable authentication has applications in electronic commerce as well. As pointed out by Aumann and Rabin [1, 2] , the use of deniable authentication, instead of regular signatures, can be used to communicate confidential terms of a transactions (such as price offers) without fear that such terms could be shown to a third party in an effort to obtain better terms (such as a better price offer).
THE MODEL
The model used in the paper for the analysis of the authentication protocols was introduced by Bellare et al. [3] as a new modular approach to prove the security of authentication and key exchange protocols. Here we reuse and extend that idea for the analysis of protocols for deniable authentication.
This model deals with two kinds of network: an ideal authenticated network and a more realistic unauthenticated network. The former models a simplified peer-to-peer network of authenticated links in which the powers of adversary are limited to manage the delivery of the messages exchanged by the parties (it can't inject or manipulate messages) and to corrupt some of them. The latter has characteristics of a real network (with unauthenticated links) in which the adversary has full powers on the communication channels, so it can change and forge new messages.
The task to prove any kind of properties (like secrecy) of a protocol in a simplified world like our authenticated model is simpler than in a real network. To obtain a version of the protocol that works in a realistic unauthenticated network we can use special protocol compilers named authenticators that, informally, take a protocol for (ideally) authenticated networks and turns it in a protocol that has similar inputoutput characteristics in an unauthenticated network. This way to proceed permits to modularize the analysis of the properties of protocols. In [3] this was applied to prove the full security of Key Exchange protocols.
Refer to the full version of this paper for the necessary details of the model as introduced by Bellare et al.
Extension for deniable methods
The goal of this paper is to focus on methods of authentication that provide the desirable property to be deniable. A protocol for the authentication of a message is a protocol between a party A (who sends the message and proves its identity) and a party B that permits the latter to verify the integrity of the message and the identity of the sender A. Informally, we say that this kind of protocol is deniable if the transcript of its execution can't permit a third party to verify the participation of A. That is, the transcript of the interaction cannot be used as evidence that A took part in the protocol (i.e. A or B can later deny that the authentication took place).
For example, to digitally sign a message m with the secret key of A could be a good way to obtain message authentication but this technique is completely undeniable: speaking of long-term certified signing key, only A could produce a valid signature and it is a proof for third parties. From this, the deep differences between digital signatures and methods for deniable authentication.
The original model of Bellare et al. defines authenticators as secure protocols to authenticate messages. We extend the concept of authenticator to cover the notion of "deniable protocol".
Note that the simulator S (B) λ can't use the private information of the parties (i.e. private keys). This is enough to prove that the transcript of any session of λ can't be used by third parties to verify the participation of the involved participants. In fact, anyone could produce realistic transcripts of λ using the simulator S (B)
λ . There are, as usual, three flavors of the above definition depending of what kind of indistinguishability the simulator achieves. We say that a deniable authenticator is perfectly or statistically zero-knowledge if the real and simulated transcripts follow distributions which are either identical or statistically close. We say that a deniable authenticator is computational zero-knowledge if the real and simulated transcripts follow distributions which are computationally indistinguishable (see [14, 15] 
for definitions of the various types of indistinguishability).
Remark: In [10] the authors do not specify what kind of indistinguishability they require, but it is clear from the context that they consider computational zero-knowledge protocols to be deniable. In [28] computational zero-knowledge is explicitly mentioned as sufficient for deniable authentication. On the other hand Katz in [21] explicitly limits deniable authentication protocols to be statistical ZK.
Forward Deniability
If we look at the example in Section 1.1, we see that deniability is not just a concern of the sender, but also of the receiver. In order to ensure forward deniability we need to make sure that at the end of a real execution, the sender does not inherit a "witness" of the fact that the transcript is real.
Basically it must be hard for Alice to present a "witness" of the fact that a particular transcript is real. More generally we need to enforce that for a simulated transcript we can create a simulated state for the sender which looks "as good" as the real state after a real execution of the protocol. Notice that in the example above this would prevent Alice to prove that a certain message really came from her, as whatever state she presents to prove such a fact, it might as well be a fake state for a simulated transcript.
We now give a formal definition. Let λ be a deniable authenticator, and A a sender. With int λ,A (m) we denote the internal state of A produced by running λ on m: the messages sent and received and the internal coin tosses 7 .
That is int λ,A (m) is what is added to the internal state of
Also with trans λ (m) (resp. simtrans λ (m)) we denote the random variable describing the transcript (resp. simulated transcript) of an execution λ on input message m.
Definition 2. Let λ be a deniable authenticator between sender A and a receiver B. Let xA be the private input (secret key) of A. We say that λ is forward deniable if there exists a simulator S FDλ that on input xA and simtrans λ (m) outputs a simulated internal state simint λ,A (m) which is indistinguishable from int λ,A (m).
Remark: Why are we giving the secret key to the simulator? Notice that in our definition we are allowing the simulator to know xA. Indeed recall that our goal is to prevent Alice, the Sender, from proving that a transcript is real. Thus by giving the simulator her secret key xA we are modeling the fact that this simulated internal state can be produced by Alice, and thus we have no reason to believe her when she says that a transcript is either real or simulated.
Remark: On the honesty of the Sender. In the definition above, we assume that A behaves honestly during the executions of λ. In particular we assume that A chooses its random input as prescribed by the protocol. A possible way for A to prove that a transcript is real, is to modify its coin tosses in a way that is not detectable from the outside but that will allow her later to prove that those messages were generated by her (for example, she could choose a random string r not by directly sampling it, but by choosing r and setting r = f (r ) where f is a hard-to-invert permutation). This kind of behavior was termed semi-honest in [4] . Notice, however, that in the case of deniable authentication A herself is not interested in keeping such a strategy as the presence of such "witnesses", if leaked, may be used to prove that she authenticated a message.
Remark: Computational ZK and forward deniability. Consider any computational ZK protocol for an NP-complete problem, e.g. the one for graph 3-colorability [17] . The common input is a 3-colorable graph and the Prover knows such a coloring. In the first message the Prover commits to a random 3-coloring of the graph, i.e. for each vertex v commits to π(col(v)), where col(v) is the color of v described as an integer in {1, 2, 3} and π is a random permutation over the same set. Then the (honest) verifier asks for a random edge and the prover decommits, to the colors of the nodes composing that edge. Under the security of the commitment scheme this is a computational ZK protocol: the simulator for the honest verifier chooses a random edge, commits to different random colors for the nodes on that edge, and then commits to random colors for the other nodes. Note that since the simulator does not know the 3-coloring, the coloring which it commits to is not a correct 3-coloring, and that can be easily detected if all the commitments are opened. However since the commitments are secure, and only the chosen edge is opened, the protocol is computational ZK. However it is not forward deniable 8 . Indeed the prover's state contains the openings of the commitments, and thus the prover can produce information showing that a real transcript is indeed real (it contains a real 3-coloring).
A after executing λ on input m. 8 Although we defined forward deniability in the context of authentication, the definition can be extended to any twoparty protocol. This problem is shared by all the computational ZK protocols we know and thus shared by any protocol that proves deniability by reduction to such problems. In the full version, we show a deniable authentication protocol whose security is based on a reduction to a NP-complete language, and for that reason not forward deniable.
The only way in which forward deniability could be achieved is if Alice "forgets" about how she computed the commitments. I.e. erases her internal state (apart from her secret key) after the execution of the protocol. From the argument given in the previous Remark, it would appear in Alice's interest to do so. However this makes the assumption on the model that such erasures are indeed possible. This is a very strong assumption to make (e.g. see [18] for a survey on the difficulty of erasing data). Thus while we assume that Alice behaves honestly during the protocol (and has all the motivation to do so) we also assume that it is hard for her to erase traces of her past executions of the protocol from her memory.
FIRST CLASS OF SOLUTIONS
Multi-trapdoor Commitment Schemes. A commitment is the digital equivalent of a "sealed envelope". A party commits to a value by placing it into a sealed envelope (this is the "committing phase"), so that the same party may later reveal the value by opening the envelope (the "opening phase"). Further, the envelope cannot be opened by another party before the opening phase (this is known as "secrecy" or "hiding" property) and its content cannot be altered (this is known as "binding" property).
A Trapdoor Commitment Scheme (TCS) is a commitment scheme where there exists a trapdoor the knowledge of which allows to open a commitment in any possible way (we will refer to this also as equivocate the commitment). Obviously this trapdoor should be hard to compute. In this way the privacy property of the commitment is informationtheoretically guaranteed (i.e., given the commitment the receiver, even with infinite computing power, cannot guess the committed message better than at random). On the other hand, the binding property can be only be computational (for the existence of the trapdoor).
A Multi-Trapdoor Commitment Scheme, introduced in [12] , consists of a family of TCS with a specially defined binding property. He we are going to introduce a definition of Adaptive Multi-Trapdoor Commitment (AMTC) Scheme. It is inspired by the notion of Simulation-Sound Commitments 9 (SSC) in [11, 24] . In the full version of this paper, we elaborate on the differences between this definition and the definition of SSC in [24] .
An Adaptive Multi-Trapdoor Commitment (AMTC) Scheme consists of five algorithms: CKG, Sel, Tkg, Com and Equiv with the following properties:
• CKG is the master key generation algorithm: given a security parameter it outputs a pair (PK, TK), where PK is the master public key associated with the family of commitment schemes and TK is the master trapdoor key;
• Sel is the algorithm that select a particular scheme in the family: given PK it outputs a pk that identifies one of the schemes;
• Tkg is the algorithm that permit the generation of the trapdoors: given the triple (PK, pk, TK) it outputs the trapdoor information tk relative to pk;
• Com is the commitment algorithm: on input PK, pk and a message M it outputs C(M ) = Com(PK, pk, M, R) where R is the coin tosses. To open a commitment the sender reveals (M, R) and the receiver verifies using Com to recompute the commitment;
• Equiv is the algorithm that permit to open a commitment in any possible way given another opening and a trapdoor key (the master or the specific one): it takes in input PK, pk, a commitment C of a message M , the opening (M, R), a different message M = M and a trapdoor T ; if T = TK or T = tk then Equiv outputs a R , uniformly chosen among all R such that C = Com(PK, pk, M , R ).
The notion of AMTC requires the following security properties:
Information Theoretic Security For every message pair (M, M ) the distributions of the commitments C(M ) and C(M ) are statistically close;
AMTC Secure Binding Consider the following game: the adversary A is given a public key PK for a multitrapdoor commitment family, generated with the same distribution as the ones generated by CKG. Also, A is given access to an oracle EQ (for Equivocator). This oracle gets as input string (C = Com(PK, pk, M, R), M, R, M ) with message M = M and outputs a R such that C = Com(PK, pk, M , R ) (that is the oracle creates openings with an arbitrary message M ). The adversary A wins if it outputs (pk, M, R, M , R ) such that Com(PK, pk, M, R) = Com(PK, pk, M , R ), M = M and pk is different from all the public keys used during the accesses to the oracle EQ (in other words, A must never have used the oracle EQ to equivocate a commitment on the scheme with public key pk). We requires that for all the efficient algorithms A, the probability that A wins is negligible in the security parameter.
We are going to present in the next section an efficient authentication method based on the notion of AMTC. This notion can be weakened, obtaining the static variant introduced by Gennaro in [12] . We shall refer to it as (Static) Multi-Trapdoor Commitment (MTC). Briefly, in the MTC we have a different Binding game where the adversary must choose the public keys to use with the oracle before seeing the master public key PK. In the full version of this work, we introduce some alternative MTC-based authenticators. For the weaker notion of MTC, these methods are less efficient than AMTC-based one. On the other side, known MTC schemes are more effiecient than known AMTC's.
AMTC-based authenticators
Here we present a deniable authenticator λAMTC based on the notion of Adaptive Multi-Trapdoor Commitments (AMTC). First we prove that it is an authenticator then we verify the deniability of the scheme.
Let's start from the initialization function I of the protocol λAMTC . For each party Pi, the master key generation algorithm of the AMTC scheme is invoked obtaining the pair (PKi, TKi). Further, a hash function Hi is chosen from the family of UOWHFs such that it outputs strings with the same distribution of the algorithm Sel 10 . The public key of Pi is P Ki = (PKi, Hi) and the secret key is the master trapdoor key TKi. So, the public information I0 is simply the collection of all the public keys: I0 = P K1, . . . , P Kn and the secret information of the player Pi is Ii = TKi.
Next, when activated, within party Pi and with external request to send message m to party Pj , protocol λAMTC invokes a two-party sub-protocolλAMTC between Pi and Pj . Since the sub-protocolλAMTC involves only two parties, we use the names A and B instead of Pi and Pj for simplicity. In this context, with (PK, H) and TK we indicate the public and secret keys of A.
The protocolλAMTC works as follow: first A uses the hash function H to select a specific scheme from the family of AMTC schemes in the following way: pk = H(m, B) where m is the message to send and B is the identity of the receiver. After that a random string a is selected from the space of the messages of the AMTC scheme and another random string r is chosen. The commitment algorithm associated to the public key pk is used to commit the string a with coin tosses r obtaining C = Com(PK, pk, a, r). Finally, A sends 'message:m, C' to B and outputs 'A sent message m to B'.
Upon receipt of 'message:m, C' from A, party B chooses a random string c (for challenge) from the space of the messages of the AMTC scheme and sends it to A as 'challenge: m, c'.
Upon receipt of 'challenge:m, c' from B, party A uses the master trapdoor key TK to equivocate the commitment C so that the message committed becomes the challenge string c. He computes r = Equiv(PK, pk, C, a, r, c, TK) so that (c, r ) becomes another opening of the commitment C (remember that the first opening is (a, r)). A replies to B with 'reply:m, r '.
When B receives the reply, he simply checks if the pair (c, r ) is an opening for the commitment C, that is if C = Com(PK, pk, c, r ). Note that B can compute the specific public key pk by himself using the hash function H. If the check is correct, then B accepts m and outputs 'B received m from A'. Otherwise, B rejects this message and terminates this invocation ofλAMTC 11 . Note that the length of strings to commit a, c should be long enough so it's infeasible to guess them (for example, 80 bits). A pictorial representation of a complete invocation ofλAMTC for a message m can be seen in figure 1 at the end of the paper.
Theorem 3. If the underlying commitment scheme is an AMTC, then protocol λAMTC is a secure message authenticator.
Implementations. The number-theoretic constructions of simulation-sound commitments in [24] can be shown to be AMTC's and thus can be used in our protocol. They are based on the Strong RSA assumption and the security of the DSA signature scheme. We can't however use the generic construction based on one-way function as that does not satisfy the notion of AMTC.
Deniability
λAMTC is deniable for an honest receiver. Indeed in that case the simulator could: (i) compute the public key pk associated to the particular commitment scheme of the session as pk = H(m, B); (ii) choose at random the challenge string c and the randomness r ; (iii) compute the commitment C = Com(PK, pk, c, r ).
But for a dishonest verifier the way in which λAMTC authenticates the messages is actually not deniable. Here is a strategy from a dishonest verifier B who tries to get a transcript that A can't later deny. B could compute c = hash(C) for some complicated hash function hash after seeing the original commitment C. Now the above simulator will be in trouble as it chooses c before seeing C.
We modify the protocol in order to make it deniable. We assume that the public key of A contains the public key t for a regular trapdoor commitment scheme. The idea is to have B use t to commit to the challenge in advance. The protocol appears in Figure 2 .
Theorem 4. Protocol Den-λAMTC is a forward deniable authenticator if used sequentially.
Remark: Concurrent Executions. First we point out that the modified protocol Den-λAMTC remains an authenticator even if used in a concurrent setting. This is remarkable, as we need to use rewinding in the proof of its unforgeability. On the other hand the rewinding in the proof of deniability is more troublesome and in a concurrent setting the adversary can create a scheduling which will result in a running time exponential in the number of open sessions (see [10] ). Thus we can only use the protocol with a logarithmic number of such sessions open at any time, and this can be enforced by using timing assumptions as in [10] . Notice that if the parties are not concerned about deniability then unbounded number of executions can be performed concurrently.
SECOND SOLUTION
Here we show an authenticator (later proven deniable) whose security is based on the difficulty of the DDH problem in some groups.
Number Theory. In the following we denote with p, q two prime numbers such that q|(p−1). We consider the subgroup Gq of Z * p of order q and let g1, g2 be two generators 12 for Gq. All computations are mod p unless otherwise noted.
We are going to assume that the well-known Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption holds in Gq, namely that the DDH problem is difficult on this group. There are several equivalent formulations of the DDH problem. Let
The assumption that we use claims that no polynomial-time algorithm given as input the four values (g1, g2, u1, u2) can decide if it was drawn from DDH or Random.
Hash functions. We shall use two kinds of hash functions. First we will denote with H a function chosen randomly in a set of Universal One-way hash functions (UOWHFs) [26] .
Also we consider a hash function H : Gq → {0, 1} 2k , where k is a security parameter, such that 2 −k is considered negligible. H must have the following property: the distribution of H(x) when x∈ R Gq should be indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}
2k . An example of such a function is a function H randomly chosen over a set of 2-universal family [5] : in this case assuming that |q| > 2k + 2δ we have that the distribution {H(x)}x∈ R Gq is 2 −δ statistically close to the uniform one over {0, 1} 2k . To avoid choosing such a large q, one could use a cryptographic hash function like SHA1, and explicitly assume that the distribution {SHA1(x)}x∈ R Gq is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform one. In the future we shall denote with H (x) the first k-bits of H(x) and with H (x) the remaining k-bits.
The protocol. We construct the DDH-based authenticator λDDH: the choice of the primes p, q and of the generators g1, g2 can be seen as the first phase of the initialization 13 function I of the protocol λDDH. To conclude the initialization phase, for each party a pair of keys (P K, SK) is generated as follows. Consider a generic party Pi: random elements x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ Zq are chosen and the group elements c = g
are computed. Next, a hash function H is chosen from the family of UOWHFs. Further, an Universal Hash function H is chosen so that H : Gq → {0, 1} 2k . Finally, the public key of Pi is P Ki = (c, d, H, H) and the secret key is SKi = (x1, x2, y1, y2). The public information is the collection of the information on the underling group and of all the public keys: I0 = p, q, g1, g2, P K1, . . . , P Kn The Pi's private information consists of only its secret key:
Next, when activated, within party Pi and with external request to send message m to party Pj, protocol λDDH invokes a two-party sub-protocolλDDH between Pi and Pj . Since the sub-protocolλDDH involves only two parties, we use the names A and B instead of Pi and Pj for simplicity. Going into details: first, A sends 'message:m' to B (A also outputs 'A sent message m to B'). Upon receipt of 'message:m' from A, party B creates a challenge for A as follows: a random r ∈ Zq is chosen and then the following values are computed
13 These values could also be specific to a user's public key, rather than common to all users.
the message for A is 'challenge:m, u1, u2, h1'. 14 Upon receipt of 'challenge:m, u1, u2, h1' from B, party A:
• checks the validity of the received challenge computing the values α = H(m, B) , v = u • replies to the challenge with 'reply:m, h2' where h2 = H (v).
Finally, when B receives the message 'reply:m, h2' from A he proceeds as follows: if h2 = H (v) (using its copy of v) then B accepts m and outputs 'B received m from A'. Otherwise, B rejects this message and terminates this invocation ofλDDH. A pictorial representation of a complete invocation ofλDDH for a message m can be seen in figure 3 .
Theorem 5. Assume that the DDH assumption holds on the group Gq then protocol λDDH is a secure message authenticator.
Deniability for λ DDH
As in the previous case, protocol λDDH can be proven to be a deniable authenticator if the receiver is honest. Indeed simulator can be defined by choosing at random r∈ R Zq and computing the appropriate values, like an honest receiver would.
The case of a dishonest receiver is more complicated. Here we do not have an attack, but a black box simulation of the receiver fails (once the dishonest simulator sends us 'challenge:m, u1, u2, h1, how are we going to simulate the answer h2?) 16 . We introduce a challenge-response mechanism where A commits to the answer h2 and then reveals it only after B shows that he knows h2 as well. However at this point it is redundant to split H(v) in two pieces and we can just use v alone.
The protocol appears in Figure 4 . We assume that A's public key includes an unconditionally binding commitment scheme COM (i.e. a commitment scheme that can be opened in only one way even if you have infinite computing power, but on the other hand its secrecy is computational).
Theorem 6. Protocol Den-λDDH is a forward deniable authenticator if used sequentially.
Remark: The first step is malleable. The above protocol shows how far we have gone from the CCA paradigm. We can think of u1, u2 as the "encryption" of a key, and of v as the MAC of the message. But if we do that, then we do not know how to prove the encryption step to be CCA-secure.
Remarks: Concurrent Executions. As in the previous section, the unforgeability property of this authenticator holds in a concurrent setting (as in all the authenticators in the CCA paradigm). If we use timing assumptions to force only a logarithmic number of executions to be open at any time, we achieve deniability in the concurrent setting as well.
In the full version, we discuss a generalization of this method using Projective Hash Functions. 
